Niall Ferguson's Argument Against the Iran Deal: A Response

In a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal, Niall Ferguson wrote an article in opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. (Read it here)  One of the aspects of this article that makes it interesting is its honesty.  A little bit of reading between the lines reveals that there is very little real debate about the Iran deal's efficacy in terms of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  Indeed, arms control experts from around the world (including, in contrast to the local politicians, Israel) have almost unanimously supported the deal. (For one recent statement from arms control experts, see here)  Most arguments against the deal make a few pro forma objections to its inspection mechanism, then move on to the real issues, which are the deal's sunset clauses and its potential boosting of Iran's regional power.  To his credit, Ferguson admits that this deal makes it extremely unlikely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons in the near future, and skips straight to his real objections.

Ferguson's basic objection is that the deal is essentially a play for time, in hopes that the strategic situation in the Middle East will be more favourable to the US when the deal expires than it is now.  In making this argument, he draws on Henry Kissinger's idea of "the problem of conjecture."  The "problem of conjecture" is the political dilemma faced by statesmen who have to choose between taking a decisive action to head off a threat early, or to play for time in hopes that a better option will present itself in the future.  The difficulty is that, if the difficult immediate action is taken, it will be difficult to retroactively prove that it was necessary.  The costs of such an action will be immediately apparent, while its benefits will always be a matter of dispute, since opponents will always be able to claim that the feared calamity never would have occurred anyway.
Of course, if such a play for time were likely to be successful, it would obviously be a preferable option to forcing a confrontation now.  However, Ferguson argues that this is not the case, especially given the deal's relaxation of the restrictions on conventional arms sales to Iran.  In the article, he writes, "Now ask yourself: How are Iran's rivals likely to respond to this timeline of Iranian rearmament[?]...The president's conjecture is that by buying time he also gets closer to a regional balance.  The alternative and much more likely scenario is that he gets an arms race and escalating conflict."  According to Ferguson, Iran's greater access to weapons and funds will embolden the regime, leading to a fearful reaction from other Middle Eastern states, and a general escalation of conflict in the region.  This combination of increasing Iranian strength and escalating conflict is likely, according to Ferguson, to lead to a much bleaker strategic situation in 10-15 years, when most of the restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire, than America faces now.

To some extent, Ferguson's claims are right.  It is likely that Iran will be more powerful in 10 to 15 years than it is now.  If America's interests are defined the way they traditionally have been in America's governing circles, with the Gulf States and Israel defined as "allies", and Iran defined as an "enemy" (almost completely regardless of their actual actions, as demonstrated in the case of Saudi Arabia's longstanding support of various terrorist groups, as well as its financial support for the spread of the reactionary Wahhabi sect of Islam, which in itself creates a fertile breeding ground for extremism around the world), it's true that the long-term strategic situation looks somewhat bleak.  The Gulf states all face severe internal problems, severely exacerbated by low oil prices and a decline in their ability to buy the consent of their populations. Meanwhile, a number of new economic opportunities are opening up for Iran, which will likely increase its economic power moving foward, while it maintains its influence on Shi'a groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, along with its soft power throughout the Shi'a world. To this extent, Ferguson's analysis is accurate.

However, where Ferguson most signally fails is in suggesting a reasonable alternative. In the past, Ferguson has suggested a military strike, but beyond the intrinsic undesirability of war, this option presents a number of difficulties. The first is that any strike on Iran would risk bringing about the end of Iranian cooperation in the fight against IS. Given that Iranian-backed Shi'a militias have been the only non-Kurdish force in Iraq capable of resisting IS, an end to Iranian activity there could lead to a resurgence of IS, and perhaps even the fall of Baghdad. The second is the risk of retaliatory actions by Iran's allies, such as Hezbollah. Finally, there is the risk of the failure of an American strike to actually halt Iran's nuclear program. It is a point of contention whether or not American ordinance is capable of destroying Iran's Fordow facility, and it is agreed on all sides that Iran is fairly close to nuclear weapons capability already. Of course, if it were under attack, Iran would have the strongest of motives to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. Unless American forces can destroy Fordow quickly (which is doubtful) attacking Iran is perhaps the best possible way to ensure that it does indeed obtain a nuclear weapon.

If a military attack is not an option, what about strengthened sanctions? This seems to be the thinking behind the repeated Republican assertion that,  "The alternative to a bad deal is a better deal." This approach, however, ignores the international context. The P5+1 did not sign on to limit Iran's regional ambitions, or even to prevent Iran from enriching uranium. Now that a deal is on the table that is backed by the international non-proliferation community, it is highly unlikely that the European nations, much less Russia and China, will be willing to continue sanctions merely because America decides that it's primary goal all along was not nuclear non-proliferation, but rather the containment of Iran's regional ambitions. Such an act of bad faith would be more likely to damage America's world standing than that of Iran. (For an interesting expansion of this point, see here)

However, the deepest and most significant problem with Ferguson's analysis is his rigid ideological framework (Iran bad, Israel and the conservative Sunni powers good, or at least unquestionably less bad). An improved strategic situation at the expiry of the deal does not have to mean a weakened Iran. For decades, America has tried to maintain stability  in the Middle East by supporting established and conservative powers, especially Saudi Arabia, Israel and pre-revolutionary Egypt. But support for such a dubious cast of friends has only led to increased instability, as it has bred support for a wide variety of violent opposition movements. Blaming Iran for sometimes supporting these groups is a lazy shortcut to avoid the responsibility of America and its allies for creating the conditions that generate these groups. As an example, Iran did not conjure Hezbollah out of thin air. Hezbollah grew out of Israel's 20-year occupation of southern Lebanon. Nor would the removal of Iranian support cause Hezbollah to disappear. Only a fair settlement of the just grievances of the population can do that.

After more than 50 years of violence and repression, it's time to start dealing with issues in the Middle East by working out solutions with all the relevant players (including Shi'a minorities). Given its popularity with the "Shi'a street", Iran has a crucial role to play in these diplomatic endeavors. Trying to push Iran out of the Middle East all but ensures that none of the regions problems will be resolved. Hopefully this agreement will be the first step toward a more co-operative approach.