Over the past few years, the rise of China has been a constant topic in discussions of international politics. Although China is experiencing an economic downturn at present, which presents some difficulties for the continued growth of its power, this is likely a cyclical phenomenon, and even a moderate rate of economic growth, when combined with China's massive population, would provide a solid basis for China to become easily the preeminent power in Asia. At the same time, China has been devoting an increasingly large slice of this increasingly large economic pie to military spending, which has been growing by more than 10% per year in recent years (see here). These facts have produced a burst of confidence in the People's Liberation Army. In his book, America's Coming War with China, Ted Galen Carpenter quotes Michael Pillsbury's study, which notes that the PLA has produced over 200 studies of possible wars with the United States, and not one of those studies admits the existence of any scenario in which an American victory is likely.
This confidence has been displayed in ever more aggressive actions in the South China Sea. After drilling for oil in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands last year (an action which led to violent protests in Vietnam), China has returned to drill again in the same area this summer (see here). Earlier this year, China carried out large-scale land reclamation activities in the disputed Spratly Islands (see here). In response to the accusation that China was "bullying" smaller countries, a Chinese spokesperson denied the charge, but also further commented that small countries should avoid "unreasonable demands". (See here) Although it could be claimed that this comment is merely stating a fairly unobjectionable principle (Presumably few people would argue that any country should be unreasonable), it's difficult to avoid noticing that China explicitly states this as an obligation specifically applying to small countries. The unstated implication seems to be that small countries should expect to be moderately bullied, and not be so "unreasonable" as to expect true Great Powers (like China) to treat them as genuine equals. This impression is further reinforced by China's refusal to submit any of its claims to legal arbitration, or to engage in any sort of multilateral discussions, preferring bilateral discussions where China's superior power can be brought to bear against each small country individually.
This kind of behaviour is further rooted in a pattern of international relations rooted in China's ancient past. As Edward Luttwak notes in his book, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, a narrative has taken root in China's Communist Party according to which China is entitled not only to the revision of its semi-colonized status of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but to the full restoration of its status as the "Middle Kingdom" with hegemonic power in East Asia. In this view of international relations, there is no room for any recognition of other Asian states as fully equal to China, nor is there room for any real respect (as opposed to tactical acquiescence) for international institutions. Although this does not imply any Chinese ambition to interfere with or control the internal affairs of other countries, it does imply that, in the international arena and when dealing with regional Asian Pacific issues, China's voice should be the loudest and have the final say.
However, in the final analysis, China's strength isn't the primary reason why China is dangerous. Whatever the pretensions of the writers of PLA strategic studies, the Chinese military is no match for the United States Navy and Air Force, much less for the combined forces of America, Japan, Australia and the ASEAN nations. Any decisive Chinese move for truly hegemonic power in Asia would be self-defeating. Although China can continue to build its power by the kind of creeping encroachments it has been engaging in lately, these kinds of actions will never add up to a foundation for truly hegemonic power in the region. A rational China is likely no more than a manageable threat to the Asian Pacific equilibrium. What makes China dangerous is the risk that it may act irrationally, a risk that is presented not so much by China's strength as by its weakness. This weakness is primarily seen in three areas.
The first area of weakness is the environment. China's air pollution is notorious, and is getting worse. It has been estimated that air pollution is reducing life expectancy in the north of the country by 5.5 years, and (as of 2008) was reducing China's Gross National Income by 9% (see here). What is not as well-known is that China also has major problems with water pollution. It has already been estimated that two thirds of China's cities are suffering from a shortage of clean water. Again, this problem will certainly get worse before it gets better.
The second area of weakness is ethnic tensions. Xinjiang and the Tibetan Autonomous Region are both fertile seedbeds of ethnic tension, which threaten both China's internal stability and its relationships with the countries of Central Asia (most of whose populations are ethnically related to the Turkic Uyghurs of Xinjiang). In both cases, ethnic tensions are aggravated as well by the Communist Party's repressive religious policies toward Tibetan Buddhism and Islam in Xinjiang. Although it has not been confirmed, it is possible that these tensions have even had major effects beyond the borders of China. The investigation into the recent bombing of the Erawan shrine in Bangkok has unearthed considerable evidence that the motive behind the attack may have been anger at the Thai government for forcibly repatriating Uyghur refugees to China (see here). Again, this problem seems to be one that, even in the best case scenario, will get worse before it gets better.
These first two problems, although serious, are probably manageable. Although dealing with the environmental crisis will have major economic costs, and ethnic tensions will threaten the internal stability of China, there are remedies that the Chinese government can apply to deal with these problems. However, there is a third problem which, in addition to being extremely serious, is beyond the regime's problem to solve in the short, or even the medium, term. This problem is China's looming demographic crisis. Since the introduction of the one-child policy in the 1980's, China has had a very low birthrate. As a result of this low birthrate, China's population is aging rapidly. In 2012, China passed an important tipping point as the working-age population began to shrink (see here). Since China's birthrate remains very low, for the foreseeable future an ever diminishing group of working age people will have to support an ever increasing group of retirees. Furthermore, this transition has to be made in a situation where China's economy is still relatively undeveloped. Although China has a very high total GDP, due to its large population, its GDP per capita is still relatively low. This means that the resources available to care for this growing army of retirees are quite limited. Other countries that have had to make similar transitions, such as Japan and Germany, have had to do so from a much higher economic level. China will have to make this transition with much more limited resources, while simultaneously trying to contain severe ethnic tensions and deal with an environmental crisis of near-apocalyptic proportions. On top of all this, there is nothing China can do to reduce these strains. China is not an attractive destination for immigrants, and attempts to increase the birthrate by relaxing the one-child policy have largely failed. Even were such efforts successful, it would take the better part of 20 years for them to have any effect on the size of the workforce. Even in the best-case scenario (which, given the failure of the birthrate to rebound since the relaxing of the one-child policy, is extremely unlikely), China is doomed to a decades-long decline in its economic, and therefore its military, potential.
Given the previously-mentioned confidence of the PLA, it seems that the penny hasn't yet dropped for the Chinese leadership. Whether or not the current economic downturn successfully draws the regime's attention to its own weaknesses, such a realization must occur at some point, probably within the next ten years. When this occurs, there is no telling how China's leadership may react. A regime that has told both itself and its people that it is entitled to (and will inevitably achieve) the leadership of the Asia Pacific region, will have to face the possibility of a turn inwards and an almost complete abandonment of its foreign policy ambitions. Given the degree to which the Chinese regime has stoked aggressive nationalism in the Chinese population, it is highly doubtful whether the regime can make such a turn while maintaining its legitimacy. The temptation will be extremely strong to make a decisive move, either against Taiwan or in the South China Sea, while such a move still seems possible. It is not the Chinese regime's current confidence, but its future desperation, that should be a major concern to the rest of the world.
