Niall Ferguson's Argument Against the Iran Deal: A Response

In a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal, Niall Ferguson wrote an article in opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. (Read it here)  One of the aspects of this article that makes it interesting is its honesty.  A little bit of reading between the lines reveals that there is very little real debate about the Iran deal's efficacy in terms of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  Indeed, arms control experts from around the world (including, in contrast to the local politicians, Israel) have almost unanimously supported the deal. (For one recent statement from arms control experts, see here)  Most arguments against the deal make a few pro forma objections to its inspection mechanism, then move on to the real issues, which are the deal's sunset clauses and its potential boosting of Iran's regional power.  To his credit, Ferguson admits that this deal makes it extremely unlikely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons in the near future, and skips straight to his real objections.

Ferguson's basic objection is that the deal is essentially a play for time, in hopes that the strategic situation in the Middle East will be more favourable to the US when the deal expires than it is now.  In making this argument, he draws on Henry Kissinger's idea of "the problem of conjecture."  The "problem of conjecture" is the political dilemma faced by statesmen who have to choose between taking a decisive action to head off a threat early, or to play for time in hopes that a better option will present itself in the future.  The difficulty is that, if the difficult immediate action is taken, it will be difficult to retroactively prove that it was necessary.  The costs of such an action will be immediately apparent, while its benefits will always be a matter of dispute, since opponents will always be able to claim that the feared calamity never would have occurred anyway.
Of course, if such a play for time were likely to be successful, it would obviously be a preferable option to forcing a confrontation now.  However, Ferguson argues that this is not the case, especially given the deal's relaxation of the restrictions on conventional arms sales to Iran.  In the article, he writes, "Now ask yourself: How are Iran's rivals likely to respond to this timeline of Iranian rearmament[?]...The president's conjecture is that by buying time he also gets closer to a regional balance.  The alternative and much more likely scenario is that he gets an arms race and escalating conflict."  According to Ferguson, Iran's greater access to weapons and funds will embolden the regime, leading to a fearful reaction from other Middle Eastern states, and a general escalation of conflict in the region.  This combination of increasing Iranian strength and escalating conflict is likely, according to Ferguson, to lead to a much bleaker strategic situation in 10-15 years, when most of the restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire, than America faces now.

To some extent, Ferguson's claims are right.  It is likely that Iran will be more powerful in 10 to 15 years than it is now.  If America's interests are defined the way they traditionally have been in America's governing circles, with the Gulf States and Israel defined as "allies", and Iran defined as an "enemy" (almost completely regardless of their actual actions, as demonstrated in the case of Saudi Arabia's longstanding support of various terrorist groups, as well as its financial support for the spread of the reactionary Wahhabi sect of Islam, which in itself creates a fertile breeding ground for extremism around the world), it's true that the long-term strategic situation looks somewhat bleak.  The Gulf states all face severe internal problems, severely exacerbated by low oil prices and a decline in their ability to buy the consent of their populations. Meanwhile, a number of new economic opportunities are opening up for Iran, which will likely increase its economic power moving foward, while it maintains its influence on Shi'a groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, along with its soft power throughout the Shi'a world. To this extent, Ferguson's analysis is accurate.

However, where Ferguson most signally fails is in suggesting a reasonable alternative. In the past, Ferguson has suggested a military strike, but beyond the intrinsic undesirability of war, this option presents a number of difficulties. The first is that any strike on Iran would risk bringing about the end of Iranian cooperation in the fight against IS. Given that Iranian-backed Shi'a militias have been the only non-Kurdish force in Iraq capable of resisting IS, an end to Iranian activity there could lead to a resurgence of IS, and perhaps even the fall of Baghdad. The second is the risk of retaliatory actions by Iran's allies, such as Hezbollah. Finally, there is the risk of the failure of an American strike to actually halt Iran's nuclear program. It is a point of contention whether or not American ordinance is capable of destroying Iran's Fordow facility, and it is agreed on all sides that Iran is fairly close to nuclear weapons capability already. Of course, if it were under attack, Iran would have the strongest of motives to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. Unless American forces can destroy Fordow quickly (which is doubtful) attacking Iran is perhaps the best possible way to ensure that it does indeed obtain a nuclear weapon.

If a military attack is not an option, what about strengthened sanctions? This seems to be the thinking behind the repeated Republican assertion that,  "The alternative to a bad deal is a better deal." This approach, however, ignores the international context. The P5+1 did not sign on to limit Iran's regional ambitions, or even to prevent Iran from enriching uranium. Now that a deal is on the table that is backed by the international non-proliferation community, it is highly unlikely that the European nations, much less Russia and China, will be willing to continue sanctions merely because America decides that it's primary goal all along was not nuclear non-proliferation, but rather the containment of Iran's regional ambitions. Such an act of bad faith would be more likely to damage America's world standing than that of Iran. (For an interesting expansion of this point, see here)

However, the deepest and most significant problem with Ferguson's analysis is his rigid ideological framework (Iran bad, Israel and the conservative Sunni powers good, or at least unquestionably less bad). An improved strategic situation at the expiry of the deal does not have to mean a weakened Iran. For decades, America has tried to maintain stability  in the Middle East by supporting established and conservative powers, especially Saudi Arabia, Israel and pre-revolutionary Egypt. But support for such a dubious cast of friends has only led to increased instability, as it has bred support for a wide variety of violent opposition movements. Blaming Iran for sometimes supporting these groups is a lazy shortcut to avoid the responsibility of America and its allies for creating the conditions that generate these groups. As an example, Iran did not conjure Hezbollah out of thin air. Hezbollah grew out of Israel's 20-year occupation of southern Lebanon. Nor would the removal of Iranian support cause Hezbollah to disappear. Only a fair settlement of the just grievances of the population can do that.

After more than 50 years of violence and repression, it's time to start dealing with issues in the Middle East by working out solutions with all the relevant players (including Shi'a minorities). Given its popularity with the "Shi'a street", Iran has a crucial role to play in these diplomatic endeavors. Trying to push Iran out of the Middle East all but ensures that none of the regions problems will be resolved. Hopefully this agreement will be the first step toward a more co-operative approach.

Lies, Damn Lies and Western Media Coverage of Russia

Since the Maidan Revolution, Russia has been receiving somewhat more media attention than previously (although still not as much as China or the Middle East). Unfortunately, the quality of this media coverage has been fairly low. Most coverage follows an a priori format according to which Russia is constantly on the verge of some disaster or another, and the intentions of the country as a whole, or Vladimir Putin in particular, have to be seen in a purely malevolent light, with little attempt made to understand the concerns and legitimate complaints of the other side.

Paul Robinson, on his Irrussianality blog, has written about a particularly egregious recent example of this, in which a single anecdote about the theft of toilet paper is taken as an indictment of the entire Russian economy (See here) Mark Adomanis has documented numerous cases of doom-and-gloom articles that fail to do even the most basic due diligence, such as making sure that statistics are up-to-date. Meanwhile, a 30-second Google search will reveal that, despite Russia's recent economic difficulties, GDP per capita remains near record highs, unemployment remains near record lows, the fertility rate is now the highest in Eastern Europe and above the EU average, and death rates and alcohol consumption have both significantly declined since the "bad old days" of the 1990's. This information is neither controversial nor difficult to find, yet it is routinely contradicted in the opinion columns of reputable Western media outlets.

Now that the Ukraine situation has drawn attention to Russia's foreign policy, the same tendency to neglect basic rules of evidence and fact-checking have been in evidence. For example, Anne Applebaum has claimed that Eastern Ukraine has no history of ethnic conflict, and therefore the rebels must be nothing more than a Russian puppet force. The absurdity of this claim is obvious to anyone with even the most superficial knowledge of modern Ukrainian history. Although tensions have never before been violent, the conflict between a purely ethnic Ukrainian identity for Ukraine and a more multicultural view goes back to the state's foundation. Just looking at the current conflict, the post-Maidan Rada attempted to pass discriminatory language legislation almost immediately after taking power, which was only prevented by Poroshenko's veto. Posters of the Nazi-collaborator and extreme nationalist Stepan Bandera were prominently displayed at Maidan. Neo-Fascist groups such as Svoboda and Right Sector were given prominent positions in government. After the Russian take-over of Crimea, but before the beginning of the war in the East, Russian-speaking activists were trapped in a building and burned alive by pro-Western forces. In the light of all this, it's hardly mysterious why the Russian East might have started feeling nervous. The assumption that Russia somehow must be ultimately behind the unrest has no evidence to support it, and is completely unnecessary, given that the motives of the Eastern Ukrainian activists are entirely comprehensible in their own terms.

Furthermore, the Eastern Ukrainian activists have shown considerable independence from Moscow. Putin has consistently supported a (sensible) settlement in which an undivided and neutral Ukraine grants increased authority to the regions, especially in the East. Many of the East Ukrainians, however, have pushed for either independence or annexation to Russia.This is consistently ignored by the majority of the Western commentariat.

Finally, a further disregard of fact is shown in the readiness to attribute motives to Putin with little or no basis in objective evidence. For example, the canard is often repeated that Putin intentionally creates "frozen conflicts" on the borders of Russia, as a means of exerting control over neighbouring states. The only evidence that is ever produced in support of this idea is that fact that Russia's interventions in Georgia and Ukraine have, in fact, produced frozen conflicts. On this basis, it could just as easily be claimed that America and the West prevent the solution of these conflicts with the aim of creating frozen conflicts to destabilize Russia's borders. Both claims are equally plausible (or implausible), and both claims are equally ungrounded in actual fact.

None of this is to say that all criticism of Russia is illegitimate. Russia does have some serious demographic challenges, and its economy has been hurt by Western sanctions. In its foreign relations, Russia has sometimes been guilty of acting thuggishly, and of using dirty tricks to improperly influence the domestic politics of other countries. But, if we're going to talk about Russia, let's take the trouble to do our homework, and let's avoid unproven, and therefore slanderous, accusations.

Why Norman Finkelstein is both right and wrong about BDS

In an extremely interesting episode of Al Jazeera's Head to Head program at the end of last year (Watch it here), Norman Finkelstein took on a panel of mostly One-State Solution advocates over his opposition to the BDS movement. Although Finkelstein doesn't himself make this distinction clearly, it seems that he makes two separate arguments. The first is that BDS opposes international law by tacitly opposing Israel's right to self-determination as an internationally-recognized state. The second is that BDS risks de-legitimizing the Palestinian cause by demanding a solution that is too far from the mainstream of international opinion.

In making the first claim, Finkelstein is clearly wrong. The BDS makes three demands, Israel's withdrawal from all territory occupied in 1967, the granting of full and effective equality to Israel's Arab population, and the "right of return" for the Arab refugees of 1948,as demanded by UN resolutions on the status of refugees. The problem for Finkelstein is that all three of these demands are clearly in line with international law and UN resolutions. The "right of return" has been supported in explicit connection with the Palestinian issue by past resolutions, and the Arabs' right to equality is covered by the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Finkelstein, however, argues that these three demands (particularly the right of return) mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state. This is likely true, given that the full implementation of the right of return would lead to a majority-Arab Israel. However, this is no problem under international law. The fact that Israel is a legally recognized entity within its 1967 borders does not give Israel the right to violate international law to maintain a certain ethnic character. What international law recognizes is not Jewish Israel or majority-Jewish Israel, but simply Israel. In the same way, Apartheid South Africa's recognition as a state in no way implied a right for the country to exist as a specifically white state. The difference between Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa is just as great as the difference between Jewish and post-Jewish Israel would be. In neither case does this difference imply a violation of the state's right to exist under international law.

However, the legality of the One-State Solution is a different matter from its feasibility. On this question, Finkelstein is on much firmer ground. Whenever Finkelstein is challenged by One-State Solution advocates, he asks them to name one country that has come out in support of this solution. In repeated UN votes, virtually the entire world has lined up behind the Two-State Solution, but not one country has supported the One-State Solution. One-State advocates have argued that world opinion can change, which is true, but the question is how long this will take. There are no guarantees, and in the meantime Palestine continues to be ground down, and its people continue to suffer. Politics is the art of the possible, and, as is often the case, there is a serious risk here that the best may become the enemy of the good.

One more question that needs to be addressed in this connection is the situation of the Israeli Arabs. One-State advocates have expressed concern that a Two-State Solution may lead to pressure on the Israeli Arabs to emigrate to Palestine and increased discrimination. In the short-term, I think this is likely true. However, no one can force the Israeli Arabs to leave if they don't want to. An international community that had been mobilized enough to force a Two-State Solution would never stand by while the Israeli Arabs were ethnically cleansed. All the possibilities for civil rights advocacy would still be there, and, over the long term, the defusing of the tensions caused by the occupation might even create conditions more conducive to the achievement of Arab equality in Israel. But first things first. The occupation needs to end.

Welcome to the blog!

 Hello and welcome to "The balance of power". This is a blog dealing with various topics relating to international affairs and global politics. The title of this blog reflects my commitment to the principles of the "realist" tradition of foreign policy, stretching back to 18th and 19th century figures such as Pitt and Metternich, and continuing through key 20th century figures (eg. Kennon and Kissinger) to the present day, when this tradition is represented by such key contempory foreign policy figures as Mearsheimer and Carpenter. According to this school of thought, the only way to avoid endless and unproductive conflict is for various states to recognize each other's key interests, without any one state aspiring to hegemonic power. I believe that this tradition holds the key to the wise management and possible resolution of many of the conflicts that affect the contemporary world. My four main areas of interest are the expansion of Chinese influence, especially in Southeast Asia, the tensions and periodic flare-ups in post-communist Eastern Europe, the expansion of Iran's influence in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
To introduce myself a little, I am currently working as an English teacher in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. I am hoping to begin a graduate program in International Affairs next year. I have been interested in politics since I was a teenager, when I began to get involved by campaigning for the Conservative Party of Canada (a party which, despite deep reservations about aspects of its foreign policy, I continue to support, primarily because of domestic policy issues). I love to travel, and enjoy sightseeing and visiting historic sites.