Lies, Damn Lies and Netanyahu Speeches

This post will be a little different from my usual posts.  Instead of using an essay format, I'll use a point-by-point "fact check" format to evaluate Benjamin Netanyahu's recent speech to the UN regarding the Iran nuclear deal and the ongoing Palestinian issue. (To watch the speech, go here)  This post will have two sections.  In the first sections, I'll look at claims that Netanyahu made, that are not strictly speaking false, but are seriously misleading.  Secondly, I'll take a look at some outright falsehoods in the speech.  To ensure fairness to Netanyahu, I've avoided using documentation from sources that are openly anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian or Iranian (with the single exception of one link to Mondoweiss, which is a pro-Palestinian source).  In fact, careful readers may even note one link to the official website of the Mujahidin i Khalq, a (mostly exile) Iranian dissident group whose opposition to the Iranian regime could hardly be stronger.  One final bit of housekeeping: I've used quotation marks to distinguish Netanyahu's claims from my responses.  The use of quotation marks doesn't necessarily imply that I'm directly quoting Netanyahu, since I've had to condense some of his points. (If you suspect I may have misrepresented him in any way, please feel free to "check my work" by watching the speech for yourself ;) ) So, without further ado, let's begin.

a. Misleading claims

1. "I am prepared to immediately resume direct peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority without any preconditions whatsoever."
Of course, given that this is a claim about the future (or at least about the Netanyahu government's current intentions for the future), it's impossible to say whether it is true or false.  However, what should be noted is that "no preconditions", coming from the mouth of an Israeli politician, primarily means no guarantee of a halt to settlement growth (as any guarantee would be a "precondition" to negotiations).  Under Netanyahu's leadership, Israel has continued to expand the settlements in the West Bank steadily, and the population of the settlements has grown much more quickly than the population of Israel behind the 1967 borders.  Furthermore, Netanyahu has explicitly stated that he "does not intend to evacuate any settlements." (see here)  Of course, "no preconditions" is supposed to sound reasonable and show Netanyahu's openness to discussion.  In reality, however, it shows Israel's determination to continue to create "facts on the ground" and confine the Palestinians to smaller and smaller "Bantustans" in the West Bank, all the while carrying on the pretense of negotiations intended to create a Palestinian state on the very land the Israelis continue to occupy.
2. "Israel expects the PA to honour its commitments."
It would normally be assumed that someone moralizing in this vein would be representing an entity that had a fairly good record of keeping its own agreements.  However, Israel is one of the most practiced violators of treaties in the Middle East.  To avoid getting bogged down in details, it's enough to note that Israel agreed to withdraw from the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 war, by explicitly agreeing to UN Resolution 242. (See the Wikipedia article here)  This was almost 50 years ago.  Although Israeli representatives have, rather lamely, attempted to argue that, since the resolution reads "withdrawal from lands occupied..." rather than "withdrawal from the lands occupied...", it implies no obligation to withdraw from the entire West Bank.  In addition to the fundamental silliness of this argument, it should be noted that the French text of the resolution contains the definite article, and is equally binding with the English text.
3. "In 2014, the UN passed 20 resolutions against Israel, and only 1 resolution concerning the Syrian crisis, despite the fact that the Syrian civil war has caused far more deaths than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
There are two fundamental problems with this claim.  Firstly, it ignores the nature of the UN.  Although the UN, in recent years, has extended its attention to intra-state issues (especially under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine), its fundamental and original purpose is to regulate international relations between states, and particularly to oversee compliance with treaties.  Therefore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, involving as it does the occupation of land which is not recognized as part of Israel by international law, lies closer to the UN's core mission than does the Syrian crisis, which is occurring within Syria's internationally recognized borders.  Secondly, counting resolutions is not a particularly good way of measuring the UN's treatment of a given nation.  Instead of looking at resolutions, it would be more helpful to look at practical actions that the UN has taken against a given country.  Looking at matters in this light makes it apparent that, far from being treated worse by the UN than other countries, Israel is actually treated better than average. (How many countries, other than the Great Powers, can so openly disregard the UN, without any practical consequences whatsoever?)

b. Falsehoods

1. "The Christian community in Israel continues to grow and thrive."
Funding for Christian schools in Israel last year only covered 29% of tuition, whereas private, non-state Jewish schools are funded at a level of 100%.  Although, in response to a strike and strong public pressure, the Israeli government has increased funding to Christian schools, this will only allow tuition to be reduced by about 25%, and is only guaranteed for one year. (See here)  Furthermore, since the Christians of Israel are overwhelmingly Arab by ethnicity, they face significant economic and political discrimination (see here and here).  Growing?  Yes.  Thriving? Certainly not in political and economic terms.
2. "Israel respects the religious claims of all."
Israel has failed to extend the protection to Christian and Muslim religious sites that is mandated by its own law. (See here).  Furthermore, Palestinian access to religious sites is often arbitrarily limited. (For one example, see here).
3. "MGen Salehi, Iran's army chief, has promised to 'execute Ayatollah Khamenei's order to destroy Israel.'  This constitutes a threat of genocide."
Salehi said no such thing, nor has Khamenei ever given any such order.  Western politicians and media outlets routinely engage in this sort of misrepresentation.  References to the "Zionist regime" are changed into references to "Israel" as such, then the intention to destroy "Israel" (which was never expressed in the first place) is, without any justification whatsoever, taken to mean an intention to physically annihilate its people. (For one example of the process, see here.  For another, see here, and be sure to notice, within the same article, the switch from "Israel" in the editorial summary to "the Zionist regime" in the direct quote) The first step of this equation is a flat lie.  The second step is an unjustified and unsupported extrapolation.  Even the intention to engage in a war of conquest to destroy a state in no way implies an intention to commit genocide against the people of that state, and, in any case, Iran has never expressed any interest in any such war.  Instead, Iran has held a policy of promoting "regime change" in Israel.  Of course, this is still a hostile and aggressive stance, but it cannot in any way be honestly construed as a "genocidal" or even imperialistic one.
4. "Iran has threatened to topple Jordan"
The actual quote was a response to Jordan's holding a meeting for Iraqi opposition groups, and runs, "Holding such conferences and official sessions in Jordan not only brings no immunity for this country, but in fact it places it on the cliff of insecurity." (See here)  This could, of course, be taken as somewhat menacing, but to (as Netanyahu does) summarize the whole exchange by saying that Iran had threatened to "topple" Jordan is highly dishonest, especially given that no Iranian official has ever explicitly threatened any kind of military action against Jordan.
5. "I remain committed to a vision of two states for two peoples."
Netanyahu has explicitly stated that no Palestinian state will be allowed to exist while he is in power. (See here)  Either he was lying then, or he is lying now.

It's significant that these points are not simply matters of opinion or disagreements concerning interpretation.  They are simple matters of fact, which Netanyahu routinely distorts to achieve his political objectives.  If he is this unreliable in regard to issues we can check and verify, what should we make of his statements regarding issues that are not open to this kind of public verification?

Why China is Dangerous

Over the past few years, the rise of China has been a constant topic in discussions of international politics.  Although China is experiencing an economic downturn at present, which presents some difficulties for the continued growth of its power, this is likely a cyclical phenomenon, and even a moderate rate of economic growth, when combined with China's massive population, would provide a solid basis for China to become easily the preeminent power in Asia.  At the same time, China has been devoting an increasingly large slice of this increasingly large economic pie to military spending, which has been growing by more than 10% per year in recent years (see here).  These facts have produced a burst of confidence in the People's Liberation Army.  In his book, America's Coming War with China, Ted Galen Carpenter quotes Michael Pillsbury's study, which notes that the PLA has produced over 200 studies of possible wars with the United States, and not one of those studies admits the existence of any scenario in which an American victory is likely.  

This confidence has been displayed in ever more aggressive actions in the South China Sea.  After drilling for oil in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands last year (an action which led to violent protests in Vietnam), China has returned to drill again in the same area this summer (see here).  Earlier this year, China carried out large-scale land reclamation activities in the disputed Spratly Islands (see here).  In response to the accusation that China was "bullying" smaller countries, a Chinese spokesperson denied the charge, but also further commented that small countries should avoid "unreasonable demands". (See here)  Although it could be claimed that this comment is merely stating a fairly unobjectionable principle (Presumably few people would argue that any country should be unreasonable), it's difficult to avoid noticing that China explicitly states this as an obligation specifically applying to small countries.  The unstated implication seems to be that small countries should expect to be moderately bullied, and not be so "unreasonable" as to expect true Great Powers (like China) to treat them as genuine equals.  This impression is further reinforced by China's refusal to submit any of its claims to legal arbitration, or to engage in any sort of multilateral discussions, preferring bilateral discussions where China's superior power can be brought to bear against each small country individually.

This kind of behaviour is further rooted in a pattern of international relations rooted in China's ancient past.  As Edward Luttwak notes in his book, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, a narrative has taken root in China's Communist Party according to which China is entitled not only to the revision of its semi-colonized status of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but to the full restoration of its status as the "Middle Kingdom" with hegemonic power in East Asia.  In this view of international relations, there is no room for any recognition of other Asian states as fully equal to China, nor is there room for any real respect (as opposed to tactical acquiescence) for international institutions.  Although this does not imply any Chinese ambition to interfere with or control the internal affairs of other countries, it does imply that, in the international arena and when dealing with regional Asian Pacific issues, China's voice should be the loudest and have the final say.

However, in the final analysis, China's strength isn't the primary reason why China is dangerous.  Whatever the pretensions of the writers of PLA strategic studies, the Chinese military is no match for the United States Navy and Air Force, much less for the combined forces of America, Japan, Australia and the ASEAN nations.  Any decisive Chinese move for truly hegemonic power in Asia would be self-defeating.  Although China can continue to build its power by the kind of creeping encroachments it has been engaging in lately, these kinds of actions will never add up to a foundation for truly hegemonic power in the region.  A rational China is likely no more than a manageable threat to the Asian Pacific equilibrium.  What makes China dangerous is the risk that it may act irrationally, a risk that is presented not so much by China's strength as by its weakness.  This weakness is primarily seen in three areas.

The first area of weakness is the environment.  China's air pollution is notorious, and is getting worse.  It has been estimated that air pollution is reducing life expectancy in the north of the country by 5.5 years, and (as of 2008) was reducing China's Gross National Income by 9% (see here).  What is not as well-known is that China also has major problems with water pollution.  It has already been estimated that two thirds of China's cities are suffering from a shortage of clean water.  Again, this problem will certainly get worse before it gets better.

The second area of weakness is ethnic tensions.  Xinjiang and the Tibetan Autonomous Region are both fertile seedbeds of ethnic tension, which threaten both China's internal stability and its relationships with the countries of Central Asia (most of whose populations are ethnically related to the Turkic Uyghurs of Xinjiang).  In both cases, ethnic tensions are aggravated as well by the Communist Party's repressive religious policies toward Tibetan Buddhism and Islam in Xinjiang.  Although it has not been confirmed, it is possible that these tensions have even had major effects beyond the borders of China.  The investigation into the recent bombing of the Erawan shrine in Bangkok has unearthed considerable evidence that the motive behind the attack may have been anger at the Thai government for forcibly repatriating Uyghur refugees to China (see here).  Again, this problem seems to be one that, even in the best case scenario, will get worse before it gets better.

These first two problems, although serious, are probably manageable.  Although dealing with the environmental crisis will have major economic costs, and ethnic tensions will threaten the internal stability of China, there are remedies that the Chinese government can apply to deal with these problems.  However, there is a third problem which, in addition to being extremely serious, is beyond the regime's problem to solve in the short, or even the medium, term.  This problem is China's looming demographic crisis.  Since the introduction of the one-child policy in the 1980's, China has had a very low birthrate.  As a result of this low birthrate, China's population is aging rapidly.  In 2012, China passed an important tipping point as the working-age population began to shrink (see here).  Since China's birthrate remains very low, for the foreseeable future an ever diminishing group of working age people will have to support an ever increasing group of retirees.  Furthermore, this transition has to be made in a situation where China's economy is still relatively undeveloped.  Although China has a very high total GDP, due to its large population, its GDP per capita is still relatively low.  This means that the resources available to care for this growing army of retirees are quite limited.  Other countries that have had to make similar transitions, such as Japan and Germany, have had to do so from a much higher economic level.  China will have to make this transition with much more limited resources, while simultaneously trying to contain severe ethnic tensions and deal with an environmental crisis of near-apocalyptic proportions.  On top of all this, there is nothing China can do to reduce these strains.  China is not an attractive destination for immigrants, and attempts to increase the birthrate by relaxing the one-child policy have largely failed.  Even were such efforts successful, it would take the better part of 20 years for them to have any effect on the size of the workforce.  Even in the best-case scenario (which, given the failure of the birthrate to rebound since the relaxing of the one-child policy, is extremely unlikely), China is doomed to a decades-long decline in its economic, and therefore its military, potential.

Given the previously-mentioned confidence of the PLA, it seems that the penny hasn't yet dropped for the Chinese leadership.  Whether or not the current economic downturn successfully draws the regime's attention to its own weaknesses, such a realization must occur at some point, probably within the next ten years.  When this occurs, there is no telling how China's leadership may react.  A regime that has told both itself and its people that it is entitled to (and will inevitably achieve) the leadership of the Asia Pacific region, will have to face the possibility of a turn inwards and an almost complete abandonment of its foreign policy ambitions.  Given the degree to which the Chinese regime has stoked aggressive nationalism in the Chinese population, it is highly doubtful whether the regime can make such a turn while maintaining its legitimacy.  The temptation will be extremely strong to make a decisive move, either against Taiwan or in the South China Sea, while such a move still seems possible.  It is not the Chinese regime's current confidence, but its future desperation, that should be a major concern to the rest of the world.

Niall Ferguson's Argument Against the Iran Deal: A Response

In a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal, Niall Ferguson wrote an article in opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. (Read it here)  One of the aspects of this article that makes it interesting is its honesty.  A little bit of reading between the lines reveals that there is very little real debate about the Iran deal's efficacy in terms of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  Indeed, arms control experts from around the world (including, in contrast to the local politicians, Israel) have almost unanimously supported the deal. (For one recent statement from arms control experts, see here)  Most arguments against the deal make a few pro forma objections to its inspection mechanism, then move on to the real issues, which are the deal's sunset clauses and its potential boosting of Iran's regional power.  To his credit, Ferguson admits that this deal makes it extremely unlikely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons in the near future, and skips straight to his real objections.

Ferguson's basic objection is that the deal is essentially a play for time, in hopes that the strategic situation in the Middle East will be more favourable to the US when the deal expires than it is now.  In making this argument, he draws on Henry Kissinger's idea of "the problem of conjecture."  The "problem of conjecture" is the political dilemma faced by statesmen who have to choose between taking a decisive action to head off a threat early, or to play for time in hopes that a better option will present itself in the future.  The difficulty is that, if the difficult immediate action is taken, it will be difficult to retroactively prove that it was necessary.  The costs of such an action will be immediately apparent, while its benefits will always be a matter of dispute, since opponents will always be able to claim that the feared calamity never would have occurred anyway.
Of course, if such a play for time were likely to be successful, it would obviously be a preferable option to forcing a confrontation now.  However, Ferguson argues that this is not the case, especially given the deal's relaxation of the restrictions on conventional arms sales to Iran.  In the article, he writes, "Now ask yourself: How are Iran's rivals likely to respond to this timeline of Iranian rearmament[?]...The president's conjecture is that by buying time he also gets closer to a regional balance.  The alternative and much more likely scenario is that he gets an arms race and escalating conflict."  According to Ferguson, Iran's greater access to weapons and funds will embolden the regime, leading to a fearful reaction from other Middle Eastern states, and a general escalation of conflict in the region.  This combination of increasing Iranian strength and escalating conflict is likely, according to Ferguson, to lead to a much bleaker strategic situation in 10-15 years, when most of the restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire, than America faces now.

To some extent, Ferguson's claims are right.  It is likely that Iran will be more powerful in 10 to 15 years than it is now.  If America's interests are defined the way they traditionally have been in America's governing circles, with the Gulf States and Israel defined as "allies", and Iran defined as an "enemy" (almost completely regardless of their actual actions, as demonstrated in the case of Saudi Arabia's longstanding support of various terrorist groups, as well as its financial support for the spread of the reactionary Wahhabi sect of Islam, which in itself creates a fertile breeding ground for extremism around the world), it's true that the long-term strategic situation looks somewhat bleak.  The Gulf states all face severe internal problems, severely exacerbated by low oil prices and a decline in their ability to buy the consent of their populations. Meanwhile, a number of new economic opportunities are opening up for Iran, which will likely increase its economic power moving foward, while it maintains its influence on Shi'a groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, along with its soft power throughout the Shi'a world. To this extent, Ferguson's analysis is accurate.

However, where Ferguson most signally fails is in suggesting a reasonable alternative. In the past, Ferguson has suggested a military strike, but beyond the intrinsic undesirability of war, this option presents a number of difficulties. The first is that any strike on Iran would risk bringing about the end of Iranian cooperation in the fight against IS. Given that Iranian-backed Shi'a militias have been the only non-Kurdish force in Iraq capable of resisting IS, an end to Iranian activity there could lead to a resurgence of IS, and perhaps even the fall of Baghdad. The second is the risk of retaliatory actions by Iran's allies, such as Hezbollah. Finally, there is the risk of the failure of an American strike to actually halt Iran's nuclear program. It is a point of contention whether or not American ordinance is capable of destroying Iran's Fordow facility, and it is agreed on all sides that Iran is fairly close to nuclear weapons capability already. Of course, if it were under attack, Iran would have the strongest of motives to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. Unless American forces can destroy Fordow quickly (which is doubtful) attacking Iran is perhaps the best possible way to ensure that it does indeed obtain a nuclear weapon.

If a military attack is not an option, what about strengthened sanctions? This seems to be the thinking behind the repeated Republican assertion that,  "The alternative to a bad deal is a better deal." This approach, however, ignores the international context. The P5+1 did not sign on to limit Iran's regional ambitions, or even to prevent Iran from enriching uranium. Now that a deal is on the table that is backed by the international non-proliferation community, it is highly unlikely that the European nations, much less Russia and China, will be willing to continue sanctions merely because America decides that it's primary goal all along was not nuclear non-proliferation, but rather the containment of Iran's regional ambitions. Such an act of bad faith would be more likely to damage America's world standing than that of Iran. (For an interesting expansion of this point, see here)

However, the deepest and most significant problem with Ferguson's analysis is his rigid ideological framework (Iran bad, Israel and the conservative Sunni powers good, or at least unquestionably less bad). An improved strategic situation at the expiry of the deal does not have to mean a weakened Iran. For decades, America has tried to maintain stability  in the Middle East by supporting established and conservative powers, especially Saudi Arabia, Israel and pre-revolutionary Egypt. But support for such a dubious cast of friends has only led to increased instability, as it has bred support for a wide variety of violent opposition movements. Blaming Iran for sometimes supporting these groups is a lazy shortcut to avoid the responsibility of America and its allies for creating the conditions that generate these groups. As an example, Iran did not conjure Hezbollah out of thin air. Hezbollah grew out of Israel's 20-year occupation of southern Lebanon. Nor would the removal of Iranian support cause Hezbollah to disappear. Only a fair settlement of the just grievances of the population can do that.

After more than 50 years of violence and repression, it's time to start dealing with issues in the Middle East by working out solutions with all the relevant players (including Shi'a minorities). Given its popularity with the "Shi'a street", Iran has a crucial role to play in these diplomatic endeavors. Trying to push Iran out of the Middle East all but ensures that none of the regions problems will be resolved. Hopefully this agreement will be the first step toward a more co-operative approach.

Lies, Damn Lies and Western Media Coverage of Russia

Since the Maidan Revolution, Russia has been receiving somewhat more media attention than previously (although still not as much as China or the Middle East). Unfortunately, the quality of this media coverage has been fairly low. Most coverage follows an a priori format according to which Russia is constantly on the verge of some disaster or another, and the intentions of the country as a whole, or Vladimir Putin in particular, have to be seen in a purely malevolent light, with little attempt made to understand the concerns and legitimate complaints of the other side.

Paul Robinson, on his Irrussianality blog, has written about a particularly egregious recent example of this, in which a single anecdote about the theft of toilet paper is taken as an indictment of the entire Russian economy (See here) Mark Adomanis has documented numerous cases of doom-and-gloom articles that fail to do even the most basic due diligence, such as making sure that statistics are up-to-date. Meanwhile, a 30-second Google search will reveal that, despite Russia's recent economic difficulties, GDP per capita remains near record highs, unemployment remains near record lows, the fertility rate is now the highest in Eastern Europe and above the EU average, and death rates and alcohol consumption have both significantly declined since the "bad old days" of the 1990's. This information is neither controversial nor difficult to find, yet it is routinely contradicted in the opinion columns of reputable Western media outlets.

Now that the Ukraine situation has drawn attention to Russia's foreign policy, the same tendency to neglect basic rules of evidence and fact-checking have been in evidence. For example, Anne Applebaum has claimed that Eastern Ukraine has no history of ethnic conflict, and therefore the rebels must be nothing more than a Russian puppet force. The absurdity of this claim is obvious to anyone with even the most superficial knowledge of modern Ukrainian history. Although tensions have never before been violent, the conflict between a purely ethnic Ukrainian identity for Ukraine and a more multicultural view goes back to the state's foundation. Just looking at the current conflict, the post-Maidan Rada attempted to pass discriminatory language legislation almost immediately after taking power, which was only prevented by Poroshenko's veto. Posters of the Nazi-collaborator and extreme nationalist Stepan Bandera were prominently displayed at Maidan. Neo-Fascist groups such as Svoboda and Right Sector were given prominent positions in government. After the Russian take-over of Crimea, but before the beginning of the war in the East, Russian-speaking activists were trapped in a building and burned alive by pro-Western forces. In the light of all this, it's hardly mysterious why the Russian East might have started feeling nervous. The assumption that Russia somehow must be ultimately behind the unrest has no evidence to support it, and is completely unnecessary, given that the motives of the Eastern Ukrainian activists are entirely comprehensible in their own terms.

Furthermore, the Eastern Ukrainian activists have shown considerable independence from Moscow. Putin has consistently supported a (sensible) settlement in which an undivided and neutral Ukraine grants increased authority to the regions, especially in the East. Many of the East Ukrainians, however, have pushed for either independence or annexation to Russia.This is consistently ignored by the majority of the Western commentariat.

Finally, a further disregard of fact is shown in the readiness to attribute motives to Putin with little or no basis in objective evidence. For example, the canard is often repeated that Putin intentionally creates "frozen conflicts" on the borders of Russia, as a means of exerting control over neighbouring states. The only evidence that is ever produced in support of this idea is that fact that Russia's interventions in Georgia and Ukraine have, in fact, produced frozen conflicts. On this basis, it could just as easily be claimed that America and the West prevent the solution of these conflicts with the aim of creating frozen conflicts to destabilize Russia's borders. Both claims are equally plausible (or implausible), and both claims are equally ungrounded in actual fact.

None of this is to say that all criticism of Russia is illegitimate. Russia does have some serious demographic challenges, and its economy has been hurt by Western sanctions. In its foreign relations, Russia has sometimes been guilty of acting thuggishly, and of using dirty tricks to improperly influence the domestic politics of other countries. But, if we're going to talk about Russia, let's take the trouble to do our homework, and let's avoid unproven, and therefore slanderous, accusations.

Why Norman Finkelstein is both right and wrong about BDS

In an extremely interesting episode of Al Jazeera's Head to Head program at the end of last year (Watch it here), Norman Finkelstein took on a panel of mostly One-State Solution advocates over his opposition to the BDS movement. Although Finkelstein doesn't himself make this distinction clearly, it seems that he makes two separate arguments. The first is that BDS opposes international law by tacitly opposing Israel's right to self-determination as an internationally-recognized state. The second is that BDS risks de-legitimizing the Palestinian cause by demanding a solution that is too far from the mainstream of international opinion.

In making the first claim, Finkelstein is clearly wrong. The BDS makes three demands, Israel's withdrawal from all territory occupied in 1967, the granting of full and effective equality to Israel's Arab population, and the "right of return" for the Arab refugees of 1948,as demanded by UN resolutions on the status of refugees. The problem for Finkelstein is that all three of these demands are clearly in line with international law and UN resolutions. The "right of return" has been supported in explicit connection with the Palestinian issue by past resolutions, and the Arabs' right to equality is covered by the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Finkelstein, however, argues that these three demands (particularly the right of return) mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state. This is likely true, given that the full implementation of the right of return would lead to a majority-Arab Israel. However, this is no problem under international law. The fact that Israel is a legally recognized entity within its 1967 borders does not give Israel the right to violate international law to maintain a certain ethnic character. What international law recognizes is not Jewish Israel or majority-Jewish Israel, but simply Israel. In the same way, Apartheid South Africa's recognition as a state in no way implied a right for the country to exist as a specifically white state. The difference between Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa is just as great as the difference between Jewish and post-Jewish Israel would be. In neither case does this difference imply a violation of the state's right to exist under international law.

However, the legality of the One-State Solution is a different matter from its feasibility. On this question, Finkelstein is on much firmer ground. Whenever Finkelstein is challenged by One-State Solution advocates, he asks them to name one country that has come out in support of this solution. In repeated UN votes, virtually the entire world has lined up behind the Two-State Solution, but not one country has supported the One-State Solution. One-State advocates have argued that world opinion can change, which is true, but the question is how long this will take. There are no guarantees, and in the meantime Palestine continues to be ground down, and its people continue to suffer. Politics is the art of the possible, and, as is often the case, there is a serious risk here that the best may become the enemy of the good.

One more question that needs to be addressed in this connection is the situation of the Israeli Arabs. One-State advocates have expressed concern that a Two-State Solution may lead to pressure on the Israeli Arabs to emigrate to Palestine and increased discrimination. In the short-term, I think this is likely true. However, no one can force the Israeli Arabs to leave if they don't want to. An international community that had been mobilized enough to force a Two-State Solution would never stand by while the Israeli Arabs were ethnically cleansed. All the possibilities for civil rights advocacy would still be there, and, over the long term, the defusing of the tensions caused by the occupation might even create conditions more conducive to the achievement of Arab equality in Israel. But first things first. The occupation needs to end.

Welcome to the blog!

 Hello and welcome to "The balance of power". This is a blog dealing with various topics relating to international affairs and global politics. The title of this blog reflects my commitment to the principles of the "realist" tradition of foreign policy, stretching back to 18th and 19th century figures such as Pitt and Metternich, and continuing through key 20th century figures (eg. Kennon and Kissinger) to the present day, when this tradition is represented by such key contempory foreign policy figures as Mearsheimer and Carpenter. According to this school of thought, the only way to avoid endless and unproductive conflict is for various states to recognize each other's key interests, without any one state aspiring to hegemonic power. I believe that this tradition holds the key to the wise management and possible resolution of many of the conflicts that affect the contemporary world. My four main areas of interest are the expansion of Chinese influence, especially in Southeast Asia, the tensions and periodic flare-ups in post-communist Eastern Europe, the expansion of Iran's influence in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
To introduce myself a little, I am currently working as an English teacher in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. I am hoping to begin a graduate program in International Affairs next year. I have been interested in politics since I was a teenager, when I began to get involved by campaigning for the Conservative Party of Canada (a party which, despite deep reservations about aspects of its foreign policy, I continue to support, primarily because of domestic policy issues). I love to travel, and enjoy sightseeing and visiting historic sites.